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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In order to avoid confusion, the following facts 
are emphasized: 
1. The stipulation and order that Occidental 
relies on were from a separate proceeding in which Verden E. 
Bettilyon, counsel for Occidental, w^s himself a defendant. 
(R. at 61.) 
2. The stipulation and order relied by Occiden-
tal were mailed to Occidental with a cover letter which 
indicated that the DeBrys did not intend to release "their 
equipment package," which was described as "silverware, 
mixmaster and other items." (R. at 5^.) 
3. After the stipulation and order were signed, 
Mr. Bettilyon wrote to DeBry and stated: "Please contact 
Mr. Polichette at the condominium to make arrangements to 
pick up your "equipment package." (R. at 55.) 
4. At the hearing on Occidentals motion to 
dismiss, DeBry1s counsel failed to appear. (R. at 51-53.) 
Nevertheless, Mr. Bettilyon proceeded with his motion and 
obtained a dismissal on the merits and a judgment for 
attorney fees. (R. at 37-41.) 
5. Mr. Bettilyon did not disclose to the court 
that he personally had written a contemporaneous letter to 
DeBry that was in direct contradiction to the interpretation 
of the release he was urging. Nor did Mr. Bettilyon dis-
qualify himself as a witness. (R. at 13-15 and 33.) 
6. The "equipment package" was entirely separate 
and distinct from the "furniture package" supplied with the 
condominium. The "furniture package" was part of the 
purchase of the condominium and was part of the security 
collateral. It included such items as sofas, chairs, 
tables, beds, etc. (R. at 79-80.) The "equipment package" 
was personal property Mrs. DeBry purchased with personal 
funds, and was never part of the security for the mortgage 
loan. It included such items as cookware. kitchen 
appliances, knives, glassware, etc. (R. at 6-8 and R. 54.) 
POINT I 
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS ON AT 
LEAST TWO GROUNDS. THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Occidental argues that there is no ambiguity in 
the transaction. Therefore, Occidental argues that the 
trial court was at liberty to rule as a matter of law. 
However, there are at least two areas of ambiguity. 
A. The "Described Above" Clause. 
The release did not waive every conceivable claim. 
Rather, the release applied to the "real and personal 
property and improvements described above." (R. 63 and 
Exhibit B. to Brief of Appellant.) (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the question is whether the "equipment 
package" was "described above." In fact, the only thing 
"described above" was the condominium itself. (R. 6 3 and 
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Exhibit B of appellants1 opening brief.) Whether that was 
intended by the parties to include the "equipment package" 
is at best unclear and ambiguous. 
B. Occidental's Theory, 
Occidental argues that DeBry owns the "equipment 
package" but that he has bargained aw$y any right to sue for 
possession: 
Occidental Nebraska admitted that the 
equipment package was not part of the 
furniture described in the security 
agreement . . . even though the property 
may have belonged to DeBry, DeBry has 
bargained away his right to bring a 
lawsuit . . . 
(Brief of Respondent at p.7.) 
The idea of owning something—but being unable to 
sue for possession—is a contradiction in terms. Thus, 
Occidental's own interpretation, of the relationship is 
inherently ambiguous. 
In summary, the Release document is ambiguous on 
its face. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE AN AMBIGUITY EXISTED, ON THE FACE 
OF THE DOCUMENTS, THE TRIAL qOURT SHOULD 
NOT HAVE RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The correct procedure is fot the trial court to 
determine, as a matter of law, whether or not an ambiguity 
exists. Winegar v. Smith Inv. Co., 590 P.2d 348 (Ut. 1979). 
Here it appears that the trial court did not even consider 
3 
the question of an ambiguity. (Exhibit G. to opening Brief 
of Appellants,) 
This Court should hold that the release is ambigu-
ous on its face, as a matter of law. The case should be 
remanded to receive parole evidence as to the intent of the 
parties. University Club v. Invesco Holding, 29 Utah 2d 
1, 4 (1972). 
POINT III 
THE GRANTING OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS 
WAS IMPROPER UNDER ANY THEORY 
As is shown in the preceding sections, since the 
subject contract was ambiguous, the court should not have 
ruled as a matter of law. However, even if it were unambi-
guous, the facts of the case, especially the contemporaneous 
letters of the parties, should have precluded an order of 
dismissal under the appropriate standard for such motions. 
Motions to dismiss should not be granted unless it 
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled 
to no relief under any state of facts which could be proven 
in support of his claim. Liquor Control Commission of Utah, 
121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441 (Utah 1952). Moreover, Rule 
Occidental claims that parole evidence cannot be used 
to alter or amend an order. It is sufficient to say that 
the Order, which Occidental refers to, was entered in a 
different case. Appellants make no attack of any kind on 
that Order. 
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41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that unless 
an order for dismisally specifically states otherwise, it is 
on the merits. A review of the order in this case clearly 
shows it to be, therefore, on the merits. 
POINT IV 
OCCIDENTAL'S PERSONAL ATTACK^ DISGUISE THE 
TRUE ISSUES; MOREOVER, THEY ARE INCORRECT 
Much of Occidental's brief is an ad hominum attack 
on appellants and appellants1 counsel. For example, 
Occidental uses the terms: "legal blackmail," 
"unconscionable," "reckless di$regard for his 
responsibilities," "false affidavit," "unconscionable 
advantage," "attempt to intimidate," "unethical," etc. Such 
intemperate remarks are seldom productive. More 
importantly, they tend to draw the court's attention away 
from the merits of the case. 
In order to be thorough, appellants will respond 
to those various arguments. However, this section is 
included primarily for interest and curiosity. The Court 
has no need to resolve these personal attacks because 
Section 1, above, is completely dispositive of the appeal. 
A. The 54(b) Language. 
Occidental has accused DeBry's counsel of misrep-
resenting the history of the Rule 54(b) certification. 
Occidental states that a transcript of the hearing was 
requested, but that no such transcript appeared in the 
i 
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Record. From that fact Occident argued that DeBry's 
attorney lied about the events of that hearing. (See 
Occidental's brief at 17-21.) 
In reality, the transcript was ordered but never 
prepared because the original appeal in this case was 
withdrawn. (See Record at 169.) Since Occidental has 
sought to attack counsel on this issue, Appellants have now 
included the transcript as part of the Record. (Addendum A, 
Record at 193-201.) As can be seen from this transcript, a 
discussion was held about whether this case should receive a 
Rule 54(b) certification. Thus appellants1 statement in the 
opening brief was accurate. 
MR. DAVIS: We certainly are not 
trying to do anything with regard to 
Occidental. We don't want to change 
your mind, your honor, on that judgment. 
It's just that we don't feel that we 
could file an appeal without having 
final judgment, and Rule 54(b) upon 
which Rule 62(h) relies, Rule 54(b) says 
that in order for a judgment to be 
final, it must be expressed determina-
tion by the court, an expressed judgment 
to that effect, and a determination. 
(Addendum, Exhibit A at 7, Supplemental Record at 199.) 
B. Common Area as Personal Property. 
Occidental has referred to comments in the opening 
Brief of Appellants that an interest in common area is 
personal property as "careless disregard for an honest 
statement of facts." (Occidental's Brief at 15.) 
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Occidental goes on to say; "this statement is not befitting 
a lawyer. Minimum research, if not common knowledge, would 
indicate to him that the common areas are part of the real 
property." (Id.) 
The fact is that minimal research indicates just 
the opposite. The "interest" in common areas of condomini-
ums are occasionally held as personal property for a variety 
of reasons. See e.g. Nelson & Whitman, Real Estate Finance 
and Development, (1976) at 809-832 (discusses holding the 
interest in common area on a long term leasehold interest); 
Osborne, Nelson & Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law, (1979) 
at 800-805 (discusses holding interest in common area and 
condominium itself by owning stock in corporation - known as 
a "cooperative.") 
C. Legal Blackmail. 
Occidental alleges that Defery has brought this 
case for "legal blackmail." (Record at 13.) Occidental 
states that DeBry has easy and inexpensive access to the 
courts and that DeBry was merely trying to "intimidate" 
Occidental. 
In this case, the attorney handling the case 
(Davis) was not "lawyer/employee" as Occidental alleges, but 
an independent contractor being paid on an hourly basis. 
Mr. Davis had recently graduated from law school, and was 
continuing his studies in other subjects while doing 
"overflow" work for DeBry. 
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Mr. DeBryfs wife had purchased a condominium in 
Park City. This was her own project she personally was 
paying for the condominium and for the personal property she 
put in it. (Record at 59-60.) 
Mrs. DeBry had a good reason to reclaim her per-
sonal property. She had been told by Occidental that she 
could! When she got to the condominium and her property had 
disappeared, she had the right to seek recovery in a court 
of law. All she asks is a fair chance to state her case. 
Mrs. DeBry should not be denied her day in court because her 
husband happens to be a lawyer. 
D. Failure to Pick Up the Equipment Package. 
Occidental argues bad faith because: 
Why should Occidental Nebraska have any 
knowledge or responsibility concerning 
this personal property? . . . If the 
property ever existed, why didn!t DeBry 
remove if from the condo prior to 
delivery of the deed, as he agreed to 
do. (Brief of Respondent at p.13.) 
Obviously that is a fact issue to be litigated by 
a jury—not an appellate court. However, there is an 
abundant showing that the claim was brought in good faith. 
The evidence would have shown that when Mrs. DeBry 
relinquished the condo to Occidental's property manager, the 
equipment package was at least 90% intact. (R. at 2.) 
Occidental also states that Mrs. DeBry delayed 
picking up the "equipment package." However, the evidence 
shows that Mrs. DeBry went at the agreed time and the 
property was gone. (R. at 56.) 
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POINT V 
OCCIDENTAL HAS OFFERED NO EXPLANATION 
FOR ITS OWN BAD FAITH 
There was some confusion whether or not the trial 
court had issued a Rule 54(b) certification. In any case, 
the notice of appeal was withdrawn. (Exhibit J. to 
opening Brief of Appellants.) Occidental stipulated to that 
procedure. (Exhibit K. to opening Brief of Appellants.) 
Thereafter Occidental moved to collect on the 
supersedeas bond. (Exhibit L. to opening Brief of 
Appellants.) The trial court agreed. (R. 16 0.) 
However, the trial court has not awarded final 
judgment because there is no Rule 54(b) certification. Nor 
has this court entered any judgment. Under those circum-
stances the bond was simply moot. There was no good faith 
basis for Occidental to seek payment under the bond. That 
is especially true since Occidental stipulated to the 
procedure. (Exhibit K to Brief of Appellants.) 
This issue was briefed in the opening Brief of 
Appellants. However, Respondent's brief was completely 
silent. Occidental had no good faith basis for the attempts 
to foreclose on the bond. 
The conduct is a violation of Rule 11, U.R.C.P. 
DATED this /ffAiay of /kveirhe^ , 1986. 
^' n^ a. •_ 
H. BRIAtf DAVIS 
Attorney for Appellants 
9 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-O0O-
JOAN AND ROBERT DE BRY, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL 
TRAJNSCRIPT OF HEADING 
CAS>E NO. C83 84 OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA 
FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, 
ET AL., 
DEFENDANTS . 
-O0O-
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 4TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 
1985, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN 
THE METROPOLITAN HALL OF JUSTICE, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 
SAID CAUSE BEING HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS 
FREDERICK. 
APPEARANCES 
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS 
FOR THE DEFENDANT 
KYM MEEHAM: 
H. BRIAN DAVIS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
320 SOUTH 700 EAST, §21 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
MARK A. LARSEN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
310 SOUTH MAIN STREET, 11330 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
Rcctry Mcurtalr 
Eepcitlr$ Service, lr>c. 
712 Newhouse 8uildmg 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt take City Utah 84111 
Phone (801)5310256 
Suspn K. Hellberg, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
License #190 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR THE 
4 HEARING OF THE P L A I N T I F F ' S MOTION TO STAY JUDGMENT 
5 IN THE MATTER OF JOAN AND ROBERT DE BRY V S . 
6 O C C I D E N T A L / N E B R A S K A FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, ET AL., 
7 CASE NO. 838*f. 
8 MR. DAVIS, I HAVE R E V I E W E D YOUR M O T I O N , AND 
9 YOU MAY P R O C E E D . 
10 MR. DAV I S : THANK YOU, YOUR H O N O R . FIRST, 
H LET ME SPEAK TO THE MOTION FOR STAY OF J U D G M E N T . WE 
12 REALLY CAN'T A P P E A L THIS CASE UNTIL T H E R E ' S A FINAL 
13 J U D G M E N T , AND I THINK THAT THE CLAIM IS SO CLOSELY 
14 CONNECTED AS BETWEEN OUR CLIENT AND THE DEFENDANT 
15 MEEHAM WHO IS STILL IN THE CASE THAT WE REALLY S H O U L D 
16 HAVE A FINAL JUDGMENT AS TO THEM B E F O R E WE A P P E A L , 
17 BEFORE WE HAVE THAT RIGHT. 
18 D E F E N D A N T ' S MEMORANDUM WAS NOT RE C E I V E D BY 
19 OUR O F F I C E . IN FACT, I DON'T THINK IT WAS EVEN S E N T . 
20 THERE'S NO C E R T I F I C A T E OF MAILING SAYING THAT IT WAS 
21 DONE SO NOR ANY HAND DELIVERY OR A N Y T H I N G . WE 
22 N O T I C E D THAT THERE WAS A MEMORANDUM FILED IN THE 
23 FILE. THAT WAS B R O U G H T HERE LAST F R I D A Y , BUT THERE 
24 IS NO NO T I C E ON THE TRIAL CALENDAR FOR A T T O R N E Y ' S 
25 FEES, WHICH HE C L A I M S , FOR ONE TH I N G . I DON'T THINK 
2 
ROOTi MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERA 1CL \\C 
TEN EXCH-WO. PL-KCL >' Ik " : 
1 HE CAN MAKE THAT CLAIM W I T H O U T H A V I N G GIVEN US SOME 
2 N O T I C E B E F O R E H A N D . 
3 THE COURT: ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT THE 
4 DEFENDANT MEEHAM'S? 
5 MR. DAVIS: NO, DEFENDANT MEEHAM HAS NOT 
6 F I L E D ANY M O T I O N OR A N Y T H I N G IN R E S P O N S E TO OUR 
7 M O T I O N FOR S T A Y . M R . B E T T I L Y O N F I L E D A M E M O R A N D U M 
8 W H I C H I JUST BECAME AWARE OF THIS M O R N I N G L A S T F R I D A Y 
9 IN R E S P O N S E TO OUR MOT I O N TO S T A Y , AND P E R H A P S , Y O U R 
H O N O R , YOU DON'T H A V E THAT IN YOUR F I L E . I D O N ' T 10 
n KNOW. IT WAS N O T F I L E D IN OUR O F F I C E , AND IT WAS 
12 
15 
16 
JUST S O M E T H I N G THAT HE B R O U G H T UP H E R E AND F I L E D W I T H 
13 THE C O U R T . DO YOU HA V E T H A T , YOUR H O N O R , IN THE FILE? 
14 MR. L A R S E N : E X C U S E M E , YOUR H O N O R . 
MR. B E T T I L Y O N D E L I V E R E D TO OUR O F F I C E A COPY OF A 
M E M O R A N D U M FOR O P P O S I T I O N TO THE M O T I O N TO S T A Y . 
17 THE C O U R T : MAY I SEE T H A T , MR. L A R S E N ? 
18 YOU ARE HERE ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT MEEHAM? 
19 MR. L A R S E N : Y E S . 
20 THE C O U R T : AS I I N D I C A T E D FOR THE R E C O R D 
21 E A R L I E R , THE C O U R T R E C E I V E D T E L E P H O N E C O M M U N I C A T I O N 
22 FROM MR. B E T T I L Y O N ' S O F F I C E , AND HE I N D I C A T E D THAT 
23 HE W O U L D NOT BE P R E S E N T TO A R G U E THIS M A T T E R , BUT 
24 HE DID O B J E C T TO THE MOT I O N FILED BY THE P L A I N T I F F . 
25 MR. D A V I S : THERE IS A M E M O R A N D U M THAT HE 
R O C K Y M O U N T A I N REPORTIvr, sFRVirc ivr 
1 FILED EVIDENTLY WITH THE COURT. WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE 
2 OF THAT UNTIL WE GOT HERE THIS MORNING, AND MAYBE I 
3 DON'T EVEN NEED TO SPEAK TO THAT SINCE WE HAD NO 
4 NOTICE OF IT. 
5 THE COURT: NO, JUST ARGUE YOUR MOTION. 
6 MR. DAVIS: WELL, THE REASON I'M TALKING 
7 ABOUT IT IS THAT'S IN OPPOSITION TO OUR MOTION. 
8 THE CO U R T : Y E S , IT IS. 
9 MR. DAVIS: SO I THINK I DO NEED TO ADDRESS 
10 WHAT HE MENTIONS IN THERE. AS FAR AS ARGUING OUR 
11 MOTION, AS I SAID, WE NEED TO HAVE A FINAL JUDGMENT 
12 SO THAT WE CAN AP P E A L , BECAUSE WE DEFINITELY HAVE THE 
13 INTENTION OF APPEALING THE DECISION IN THIS CASE, AND 
14 THAT'S ALL I REALLY WANT TO SAY ABOUT THAT EXCEPT 
15 THAT I DO WANT TO RESPOND TO THE MEMORANDUM 
16 ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND SO 
17 FORTH. WHERE WE HAD NO NOTICE OF THAT, I DON'T THINK 
18 HE CAN ASK FOR THAT. 
19 ALSO, I WILL SAY, YOUR HONOR, THAT THE 
20 REAL PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE, JOAN DE BRY, WHO BOUGHT 
21 THE CONDOMINIUM IN QUESTION BROUGHT THIS ACTION IN 
22 GOOD FAITH. SHE FEELS THAT SHE HAS RIGHTS IN THIS 
23 CASE, AND WE ARE NOT DOING THIS TO TRY AND DELAY. 
24 I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY REAL HARM BEING DONE TO THE 
25 DEFENDANT IN OUR ACTIONS IN THIS REGARD AND HIM 
4 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PI 'CI vLUl . ~\: 
1 SAYING THAT HE CAN -- THAT HE E S P E C I A L L Y TOOK TWO 
2 H O U R S TO BRING THE M E M O R A N D U M UP H E R E . HE C O U L D HAVE 
3 M A I L E D IT, IF HE HAD DONE IT T I M E L Y . THAT'S ALL I 
4 REALLY HAVE TO SAY WITH THAT R E G A R D . 
5 THE D E F E N S E C O U N S E L FROM THE O F F I C E OF 
6 CRAIG A D A M S O N R E P R E S E N T I N G THE D E F E N D A N T MEEHAM HAS 
7 M E N T I O N E D THAT P E R H A P S WE CAN CHANGE THIS TO THE 
8 SALT LAKE COUNTY AS O P P O S E D TO A R G U I N G A N Y T H I N G WITH 
9 THEM. SO I WOULD MAKE THAT MOTION, THAT HE WOULD 
10 LIKE TO DO THAT WITH REGARD TO ANYTHING DEALING WITH 
H HIS CLIENT. I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER AT THIS 
12 P O I N T , YOUR H O N O R . 
13 THE C O U R T : ALL R I G H T , MR. D A V I S . 
14 MR. LARSEN? 
15 MR. L A R S E N : MY NAME IS MARK L A R S E N . I AM 
16 R E P R E S E N T I N G KYM MEEHA M IN THIS C A S E . WE HAVE 
17 WITHDRAWN OUR M O T I O N TO D I S M I S S . AS FAR AS THE 
18 MOTION FOR STAY IS C O N C E R N E D , I'M N O T SURE W H E T H E R 
19 IT WILL HAVE ANY IMPACT ON MY C L I E N T . O C C I D E N T A L / 
20 N E B R A S K A , AS I U N D E R S T A N D THEIR P O S I T I O N , IS THAT 
21 UNDER RULE 6 2 ( H ) WHICH REFERS TO RULE 5 4 ( B ) , T H E R E ' S 
22 NO REASON FOR S T A Y I N G THE P R O C E E D I N G , FOR S T A Y I N G 
23 THE E X E C U T I O N OF JU D G M E N T B E C A U S E THE J U D G M E N T IS 
24 SIMPLY FOR A T T O R N E Y ' S FEES AND A D I S M I S S A L OF THE 
25 CLAIMS A G A I N S T O C C I D E N T A L / N E B R A S K A B A S E D UPON A 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORT \\C SFRVirn ,^-r-
1 RELEASE WHICH ROBERT AND JOAN DE BRY E N T E R E D INTO 
2 A P P A R E N T L Y IN CON J U N C T I O N WITH A TRUST DEED IN LIEU 
3 OF F O R E C L O S U R E -- I MEAN, A DEED IN LIEU OF 
4 FORECLOSURE. 
5 THE ONLY CONCERN THAT I HAVE ON THE MOTION 
6 FOR STAY OF JUDGMENT IS THAT IT WILL BE OUR POSITION 
7 IN THIS CASE THAT KYM MEEHAM AS AN A G E N T OF 
8 O C C I D E N T A L / N E B R A S K A WAS COVERED BY THE TERMS OF THE 
9 R E L E A S E . I CERTAIN L Y DON'T WANT TO BE F O R E C L O S E D 
10 FROM A R G U I N G THAT POSITION, AND IT C E R T A I N L Y D O E S N ' T 
n CONCERN ME AS TO W H E T H E R OCCI D E N T A L / N E B R A S K A 
12 C O L L E C T S THEIR A T T O R N E Y ' S FEES NOW OR LATER A G A I N S T 
13 THE PL A I N T I F F S IN THIS C A S E . 
14 WHAT I W O U L D LIKE TO S U G G E S T TO THE COURT 
15 SO WE DON'T TAKE UP ANY MORE OF THE D I S T R I C T COURT'S 
16 TIME ON THIS PARTICULA R MATTER, I B E L I E V E UNDER THE 
17 LOCAL RULES, THAT THIS COURT HAS THE A U T H O R I T Y TO 
18 TRANSFER THIS MATTER WHICH ONLY INVOLVES S O M E T H I N G 
19 S L I G H T L Y IN EXCESS OF $ 1 , 0 0 0 , TO THE C I R C U I T COURT, 
20 AND JUST FOR CON V E N I E N C E OF CO U N S E L , I W O U L D S U G G E S T 
21 THAT IT BE T R A N S F E R R E D TO THE CIRCU I T COURT OF SALT 
22 LAKE DIVISION OF THIS COUNTY. 
23 THE CO U R T : ALL RIGHT, YOU HAVE NOT 
24 S U B M I T T E D A MOTION, MR. LARSEN, IN S U P P O R T OF YOUR 
25 R E Q U E S T TO HAVE IT TRANSFERRED? 
& 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SER\ ICE INC 
TEN EXa-H\. . i PL U t il "t • . 
1 MR. L A R S E N : NO, I H A V E N ' T . I TH I N K THE 
2 C O U R T CAN DO THAT ON THE COU R T ' S OWN M O T I O N . 
3 THE C O U R T : A N Y T H I N G F U R T H E R , MR. DAVIS? 
4 MR. D A V I S : YOUR H O N O R , I W O U L D LIKE TO 
5 C L A R I F Y , MR. LARSEN HAS M E N T I O N E D WHAT HIS P O S I T I O N 
6 W O U L D BE IN THIS CASE WITH R E G A R D TO D E F E N D A N T . I 
7 DON'T B E L I E V E WE A RE HERE A R G U I N G T H A T . IF WE ARE 
8 A R G U I N G , WE HAVE A R E S P O N S E TO THAT P O S I T I O N , BUT I 
9 . JUST WANT TO MAKE SURE WE ARE NOT T A L K I N G A B O U T THAT 
10 N O W . 
11 MR. L A R S E N : THE ONLY P O I N T THAT I'M 
12 M A K I N G IS THAT I D O N ' T WANT TO BE F O R E C L O S E D FROM 
13 THAT P O S I T I O N IF THIS MOTION FOR STAY IS G R A N T E D . 
14 MR. D A V I S : WE C E R T A I N L Y ARE NOT T R Y I N G 
15 TO DO A N Y T H I N G W I T H REGARD TO O C C I D E N T A L . WE DON'T 
16 WANT TO CHANGE YOUR MIND, YOUR HONOR, ON THAT 
17 J U D G M E N T . IT'S JUST THAT WE D O N ' T FEEL THAT WE 
18 ' C O U L D FILE AN A P P E A L W I T H O U T H A V I N G FINAL J U D G M E N T , 
19 AND RULE 5KB) UPON WHICH RULE 62(H) RELIES, RULE 
20 5 4 ( B ) SAYS THAT IN ORDER FOR A J U D G M E N T TO BE FINAL, 
21 IT MUST BE AN E X P R E S S E D D E T E R M I N A T I O N BY THE C O U R T , 
22 AN E X P R E S S E D JUDGMENT TO THAT E F F E C T , A N D A 
23 D E T E R M I N A T I O N . W E L L , I CAN'T R E M E M B E R E X A C T L Y HOW 
24 IT D E S C R I B E S IT, BUT IT N E E D S TO BE E X P R E S S E D SO 
25 THAT T H E R E IS NO FU R T H E R REASON TO KEEP T H A T PERSON 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORllNG SFR\i r r \\r 
1 IN THIS C A S E , A N D I DON'T THINK T H A T WAS DONE IN 
2 THIS C A S E , AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THEY ARE C L O S E L Y 
3 ENOUGH RELATED THAT PERHAPS WE SHOULD GRANT OUR 
4 M O T I O N FOR STAY UNTIL WE RESOLVE THE M A T T E R W I T H 
5 R E G A R D TO THE D E F E N D A N T , M E E H A M . I D O N ' T T H I N K 
6 THERE'S REALLY ANY HARM DONE TO THE OTHER DEFENDANT. 
7 THE C O U R T : ALL RIG H T , C O U N S E L . I D O N ' T 
8 QUITE FRANKLY SEE ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN A JUDGMENT 
9 THAT I RENDERED ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT OCCIDENTAL 
10 A G A I N S T THE P L A I N T I F F S FOR A T T O R N E Y ' S F E E S , A N D THE 
n N E E D BY THE P L A I N T I F F S TO C O N T I N U E A F T E R C O - D E F E N D A N T 
12 M E E H A M . I T H E R E F O R E DECLINE TO G R A N T YOUR M O T I O N 
13 TO STAY THE PROCEEDINGS INSOFAR AS THAT ISSUE IS 
H CONCERNED. 
15 W I T H R E G A R D TO THE R E Q U E S T T H A T HAS BEEN 
16 MADE TO T R A N S F E R THIS MATTER TO THE C I R C U I T C O U R T , 
17 I THINK THAT IS VERY A P P R O P R I A T E , AND IT IS MY 
18 ' O R D E R T H E R E F O R E THAT THIS CASE BE T R A N S F E R R E D TO THE 
19 C I R C U I T COURT IN SUMMIT COUNTY FOR ALL F U R T H E R 
20 PROCEEDINGS. 
21 I WILL ASK YOU, MR. L A R S E N , TO P R E P A R E THE 
22 A P P R O P R I A T E ORDER OF TRA N S F E R AS WELL A S , WE WI L L 
23 N O T I F Y THE CLERK TO HAVE MR. B E T T I L Y O N P R E P A R E THE 
24 O R D E R . 
25 MR. LARSEN: YOUR HONOR, IS I T POSSIBLE TO 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC 
[EN EXCH.AV.fc PLACl -LI 
1 HAVE THE MATTER TRANSFERRED TO THE SALT LAKE 
2 DIVISION? 
3 THE COURT: I DON'T THINK SO. 
4 MR. LARSEN; THANK YOU. 
5 MR. DAVIS: YOUR HONOR, I HAD ONE QUESTION 
6 WITH REGARD TO UNDER THAT ORDER IN THIS CASE FOR 
7 ATTORNEY'S FEES, I BELIEVE THERE WAS NO MORE INVOLVED 
8 IN IT? 
9 THE COURT: IT WAS, BUT WHATEVER THE 
10 EXTENT OF THAT ORDER, IT WAS NOT BEING STAYED. 
11 MR. DAVIS: FINE. I WANTED THAT FOR ThE 
12 RECORD. 
13 MR. LARSEN: DO YOU WANT ME TO INCLUDE YOUR 
14 ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO STAY? 
15 THE COURT: IT PROBABLY WOULD BE MORE 
16 CONVENIENT, MR. LARSEN, IF YOU WOULD DO THAT. I 
17 WOULD APPRECIATE THAT. 
18 (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SS. 
I, SUSAN K. HELLBERG, A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND 
REPORTER AND NOTARY PUBLIC WITHIN AND FOR THE COUNTY 
OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY: 
THAT THE FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE TAKEN BEFORE 
ME AT THE TIME AND PLACE SET FORTH HEREIN, AND WERE 
TAKEN DOWN BY ME IN SHORTHAND AND THEREAFTER 
TRANSCRIBED INTO TYPEWRITING UNDER MY DIRECTION AND 
SUPERVISION. 
THAT THE FOREGOING 9 PAGES CONTAIN A TRUE AND 
CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES SO 
TAKEN. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SUBSCRIBED 
MY NAME AND AFFIXED MY SEAL THIS ,-Jtf' 
OCTOBER, 1986. 
DAY OF 
SUSAN [K." HELLBERG ". % 
NOT ARM: PUS"Lri£l:$* 'iJND #FO 
THE C O \ J . N T V / 6 F SALct L/KE 
STATE 6 * JsJ^Hoooc^A / ' 
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